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 To what extent does “the right of the people to . . .  bear 
Arms, shall not be infringed” as guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment protect the liberty to carry firearms outside the 
home for self-defense or other lawful purposes?1  While most 
states recognize a right to do so, either with or without a 
license and subject to place restrictions, some states grant 
discretion to a law enforcement agency to decide whether a 
specific person “needs” or has “good cause” to carry a firearm 
and restricts licenses to such persons.  These discretionary 
licensing schemes have become a major issue in Second 
Amendment litigation, with some circuits upholding such 
laws2 and others invalidating them.3 
 The Supreme Court has not decided the specific issue, 
but essential to its interpretation of the Amendment in District 
of Columbia v. Heller is the following: “At the time of the 
 
1 “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
2 Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. 2018); Woollard v. 
Sheridan, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 952 (2013); 
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3rd Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014). 
3 Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Moore 
v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012); Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 
1044 (9th Cir. 2018), reh. en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019). 




founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant to ‘carry.’”4 More 
specifically, to bear arms means to “‘wear, bear, or carry . . . 
upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the 
purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or 
defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.’”5  
Preservation of the militia was the Amendment’s stated 
purpose, but most Americans valued the ancient right more 
for self-defense and hunting.6 
 While the Amendment guarantees “the individual 
right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,”7 
history and tradition do not support “a right to keep and carry 
any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever,” and 
longstanding prohibitions such as carrying firearms in 
sensitive places like schools are not in question.8  Nor may the 
right be exercised in a manner as to terrify others.9 
 Heller declared the District of Columbia’s ban on the 
possession of handguns violative of the Second Amendment.  
Recalling nineteenth century state court decisions that 
declared bans on the open carrying of handguns 
unconstitutional, the Court noted: “Few laws in the history of 
our Nation have come close to the severe restriction of the 
District’s handgun ban.”10  
 
4 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008).  While “bear 
arms” may be used in a military context, there was no “right to be a 
soldier or to wage war,” which would be an absurdity.  Id. at 586.  In 
historical usage, “bearing arms” meant “simply the carrying of 
arms,” such as “for the purpose of self-defense” or “to make war 
against the King.”  But limiting “bear arms” to an exclusive military 
usage was inconsistent with other purposes, such as for hunting.  As 
the Court humorously wrote: “The right ‘to carry arms in the militia 
for the purpose of killing game’ is worthy of the mad hatter.”  Id. at 
589. 
5 Id. (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
6 Id. at 598-99. 
7 Id. at 592. 
8 Id. at 625-26. 
9 Id. at 588 n.10. 
10 Id. at 629 (citing Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846); Andrews v. 
State, 50 Tenn. 165, 187 (1871); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616-17 
(1840)). 
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 Heller was followed by McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
which reiterated that “individual self-defense is ‘the central 
component’ of the Second Amendment right.”11 McDonald 
held that the Second Amendment applies to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment and invalidated Chicago’s 
handgun ban.12  In Caetano v. Massachusetts, the Supreme 
Court reversed a Massachusetts decision upholding that 
state’s stun gun ban.13  Since the defendant had been caught 
with the stun gun in a parking lot,14 the Court assumed that 
the Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms in non-
sensitive, public places. 
 The Court has granted a petition for a writ of certiorari 
in a Second Amendment challenge to a New York City rule 
providing that a person with a license to keep a handgun at 
one’s dwelling may not take it out of the premises other than 
to a licensed shooting range within the City.15  The plaintiffs 
wish to transport their handguns outside the City to second 
homes or to shooting ranges and competitions.16  In upholding 
the rule, the lower court relied on a declaration by a police 
official that allowing licensees to transport handguns to 
second homes or to competitions was “a potential threat to 
public safety.”17 
 However, to date the Court has not granted certiorari 
in any of the circuit decisions upholding discretionary carry 
license laws.  Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, 
dissented from the denial of certiorari in a Ninth Circuit 
decision that the Second Amendment fails to protect the right 
of a member of the general public to carry a concealed weapon 
in public, but declining to decide whether open carry is 
protected.18  Justice Thomas wrote that the Court “has already 
suggested that the Second Amendment protects the right to 
carry firearms in public in some fashion,” and that the denial 
 
11 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010). 
12 Id. at 791. 
13 Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (per curiam). 
14 Id. at 1029 (Alito, J., concurring). 
15 New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New 
York, 883 F.3d 45 (2nd Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 939 (2019). 
16 Id. at 52. 
17 Id. at 63. 
18 Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 924, 927 (9th Cir. 
2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017). 




of certiorari “reflects a distressing trend: the treatment of the 
Second Amendment as a disfavored right.”19 
 While the lower court cases involve various issues 
about the text of the Amendment, judicial precedents, 
standards of review, and criminal statistics, a major bone of 
contention has involved the legacy of the common law at the 
American Founding and the early Republic.  A virtual cottage 
industry has arisen in which certain historians argue that 
current restrictions are consistent with the common law 
history, attorneys supporting the restrictions on behalf of 
defendants and their amici rely on such historical writings in 
their briefs, and courts sift through and use or reject the 
arguments in either upholding or invalidating the 
restrictions.20 
 Opponents of recognizing that the Second Amendment 
protects the right of “the people” to “bear arms” seem 
obsessed with Edward III’s Statute of Northampton of 1328, 
which provided that no person shall “come before the King’s 
Justices . . . with force and arms, nor bring no force in affray of 
the peace, nor to go nor ride armed by night nor by day, in 
Fairs, Markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or other 
Ministers, nor in no part elsewhere . . . .”21   
 From some of the current literature, one would think 
that this monarchal decree, written three-quarters of a century 
before Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, supersedes the explicit 
language of the Second Amendment recognizing “the right to 
bear arms.”22  Moreover, as William Hawkins clarified, “no 
 
19 Peruta, 137 S. Ct. at 1198-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of 
cert.). 
20 See, e.g., Peruta, 824 F.3d at 939 (citing Patrick J. Charles, The Faces 
of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus Ahistorical 
Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 7-36 (2012)); Young, 896 
F.3d at 1077 (Clifton, J., dissenting) (citing Eric M. Ruben & Saul 
Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public Carry, 125 YALE L.J. F. 121, 125 
(2015)).  But see Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 660-61 
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (“we can sidestep the historical debate on how the 
first Northampton law might have hindered Londoners in the 
Middle Ages. Common-law rights developed over time . . . .”). 
21 2 Edw. III, c. 3 (1328). 
22 “What does the Statute of Northampton provide us in terms of 
evaluating the protective scope of the Second Amendment outside 
the home?  The answer is armed individual self-defense outside the 
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wearing of arms is within the meaning of the statute unless it 
be accompanied with such circumstances as are apt to terrify 
the people . . . .”23  Yet the beating of the dead horse continues 
unabated. 
 Litigation-driven interpretations of history to disfavor 
a meaningful Second Amendment pervade this enterprise.  It 
involves what might be called “history office law” to describe 
historians who ignore basic elements of criminal offenses in 
order to show a long-standing tradition of criminalizing the 
keeping and bearing of arms.  It also involves what might be 
called “law office history” conducted by attorneys who cite 
these historians and who cherry pick and delete passages from 
historical documents. 
 The following seeks to conduct a reality check 
regarding this history and how it is being read and used.  The 
American experience combines bills of rights declaring the 
right to bear arms together with common law restrictions 
against being armed to terrorize others, requirements to find 
sureties to keep the peace if armed and threatening to others, 
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons, and—as applied 
only to slaves and persons of color—bans on keeping or 
bearing firearms at all, or in some cases the discretionary 
issuance of limited licenses.  Other than that, the peaceable 
bearing of arms was not a crime at the Founding or in the 
early Republic. 
A. THE COLONIAL PERIOD 
 Most of the American colonies required able-bodied 
males to provide their own arms and participate in the militia, 
and at times required persons to carry arms to church.  
Carrying arms openly or concealed in a peaceable manner was 
not, generally speaking, prohibited.  The main exception was 
that some colonies prohibited slaves from keeping or carrying 
firearms.24 
 
home deserves only minimalist protection or categorical exclusion.”  
Charles, supra note 20, at 43. 
23 1 HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch. 28, § 9 (8th 
ed. 1824). 
24 See generally S. Halbrook, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (1989). 




 A New Jersey colonial law stands out as being one of a 
kind that was not found anywhere else.  In 1686, the colony 
enacted a law providing that no person “shall presume 
privately to wear any pocket pistol . . . or other unusual or 
unlawful weapons”—which did not affect open carry—and 
that “no planter shall ride or go armed with sword, pistol, or 
dagger . . . excepting . . . all strangers, traveling upon their 
lawful occasions thro’ this Province, behaving themselves 
peaceably.”25  It is unclear why the latter provision was limited 
to planters. 
 It was also unclear whether to ride or go armed 
implied an element of doing so offensively,26 as was explicit in 
the laws of other colonies.  A 1694 Massachusetts law 
punished “such as shall ride or go armed Offensively . . . in 
Fear or Affray of Their Majesties Liege People,”27 and a 1699 
New Hampshire law instructed justices of the peace to arrest 
“affrayers, rioters, disturbers or breakers of the peace, or any 
other who shall go armed offensively . . . .”28  
 The Glorious Revolution of 1689 overthrew James II, 
who had disarmed the Protestants, and resulted in the 
enactment of the Declaration of Rights, which provided: “That 
the Subjects which are Protestants, may have Arms for their 
Defence suitable to their Condition, and as are allowed by 
Law.”29  That led to overthrow or reform of the royal 
governments in some of the American colonies.30  It is unclear 
 
25 N.J. LAWS 289, ch. 9 (1686).  Patrick Charles calls this “the earliest 
American statute prohibiting ‘going armed,’” but it was unlike any 
other statute.  Charles, supra note 20, at 32. 
26 In a 1682 directive, New Jersey constables pledged “to arrest all 
such persons, as in [their] presence, shall ride or go arm’d 
offensively.” A BILL FOR THE OFFICE OF CORONER AND CONSTABLE, ch. 
18 (Mar. 1, 1682), quoted in Ruben & Cornell, supra note 20, at 130 
n.50. 
27 MASS. ACTS 10, no. 6 (1694). 
28 N.H. LAWS 1 (1699). 
29 AN ACT DECLARING THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE SUBJECT, 1 W. 
& M., Sess. 2, c.2, (1689). 
30 “The rule of James II hung as heavy over colonists in America as it 
did the people of England in 1688. . . . His arbitrary government, the 
colonists believed, was reflected everywhere; in Andros’ regime over 
all of New England, New York, and New Jersey . . . .”  DAVID S. 
LOVEJOY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 235 (1972). 
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how long New Jersey’s 1686 law remained on the books, but it 
passed into oblivion. 
 Whatever restrictive firearm law found its way into the 
books hardly amounts to a long-standing regulation with 
relevance to the Second Amendment.  Another New Jersey 
law, which passed in 1694, recited that “complaint is made by 
the inhabitants of this Province, that they are greatly injured 
by slaves having liberty to carry guns and dogs, into the 
woods and plantations, under pretence of guning, to kill 
swine.”  It thus provided that “no slave or slaves . . . be 
permitted to carry any gun or pistol, or take any dog with him 
or them into the woods, or plantations, upon any pretence 
whatsoever; unless his or their owner or owners, or a white 
man, by the order of his or their owner or owners, be with the 
said slave or slaves . . . .”31 
 Further, a 1722 New Jersey law provided that any 
“Indian, Negro or Mullato Slave . . . carrying or Hunting with 
any Gun, without License from his Master, shall, at the 
Publick Whipping post, on the bare Back, be Whipt, not 
exceeding twenty Lashes . . . .”32  That restriction may have 
been loosened later, as a 1798 law mandated whipping only 
for “any Negro [who] . . . shall be seen to hunt or carry a gun 
on the first day of the week . . . .”33 
 New Jersey had no restrictions on the peaceable 
carrying of arms by whites in the eighteenth century.  New 
Jersey’s code with statutes passed between 1702-1776 reflected 
only a prohibition on shooting matches for gambling.34  A 1776 
law defined the militia as “all effective Men between the Ages 
 
31 An Act concerning Slaves, &c., § 1, East New Jersey Laws, October 
1694, ch.II, L&S 340-342, available at 
http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/slavery/acts/A8.html. 
32 An Act to prevent the Killing of Deer out of Season, and against 
Carrying of Guns and Hunting by Persons not qualified, § 6, 2 Bush 
293, 295 (May 5, 1722), available at 
http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/slavery/acts/A15.html.  
33 An Act respecting Slaves.  March 14, 1798, Acts 22nd G.A. 2nd 
sitting, ch. DCCXXVII, p. 364-373, available at 
http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/slavery/acts/A75.html#s9.  
34 Acts of the General Assembly of the Province of New Jersey 235 
(Burlington 1776).  The code published in 1800 contained certain 
hunting regulations and a prohibition on setting a loaded gun.  Laws 
of the State of New Jersey 19-21 (1800). 




of sixteen and fifty Years,” and required each member to 
“constantly keep himself furnished with a good Musket . . . 
[or] a good Rifle-Gun,” or if a horseman, “a Pair of Pistols and 
Holsters.”35 
 In fact, New Jersey did not require a permit to carry a 
concealed firearm until 1905.36  Open carry was perfectly legal 
until 1966, when a permit requirement was imposed.37  Thus, 
in its entire history as a state until 1966, New Jersey allowed 
law-abiding citizens to carry firearms in some manner without 
being authorized to do so by the state.38  This exemplifies that, 
in America’s history and tradition, the right to bear arms has 
been the norm. 
B. CONSTITUTIONAL DECLARATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO 
BEAR ARMS AND COMMENTARIES ON CARRYING ARMS 
PEACEABLY 
 When the colonies declared themselves independent 
states, they adopted their own constitutions, several of which 
included declarations of rights.  Of those, Pennsylvania and 
Vermont declared: “That the people have a right to bear arms 
for the defense of themselves, and the state . . . .”39  North 
Carolina declared: “That the People have a right to bear Arms 
for the Defense of the State . . . .”40  And Massachusetts 
declared: “The people have a right to keep and bear arms for 
the common defence.”41 
 When the federal Constitution was proposed in 1787 
without a bill of rights, demands were made for a declaration.  
In the Massachusetts ratification convention, Samuel Adams 
proposed “that the said Constitution be never construed to 
authorize Congress, . . . to prevent the people of the United 
States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own 
 
35 Acts of the Council and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey 168-
69, 180 (Burlington 1776). 
36 Compiled Statutes of New Jersey, Vol. II. 1759 (Soney & Sage 
1911). 
37 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:151–41 (1966). 
38 See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 447-49 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, 
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1100 (2014). 
39 PA. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. XIII (1776); VT. CONST., art. I, § 15 (1777). 
40 N.C. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. XVII (1776). 
41 MASS. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. XVII (1780). 
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arms . . . .”42  In the Pennsylvania convention, the Dissent of 
the Minority proposed a bill of rights, including: “That the 
people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves 
and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of 
killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the 
people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real 
danger of public injury from individuals . . . .”43  The New 
Hampshire convention resolved: “Congress shall never disarm 
any citizen, unless such as are or have been in actual 
rebellion.”44 
 In the Virginia convention, George Mason recalled that 
“when the resolution of enslaving America was formed in 
Great Britain, the British Parliament was advised . . . to disarm 
the people; that it was the best and most effectual way to 
enslave them.”45  And Patrick Henry implored: “The great 
object is, that every man be armed.”46 The ensuing debate 
concerned defense against tyranny and invasion. 
 The Virginia convention proposed a bill of rights 
asserting “the essential and unalienable rights of the people,” 
including: “That the people have a right to keep and bear arms 
. . . .”47  In identical language, New York,48 North Carolina,49 
and Rhode Island50 joined in the demand for what became the 
 
42 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, John P. 
Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino eds. (Madison: State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin, 2000), vol. 6, at 1453. 
43 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, vol. 2 at 
623-24 (Merrill Jensen ed.) (1976) (Madison: State Historical Society 
of Wisconsin, 1976). 
44 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, vol. 18 at 
188 (John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino eds.)(1995) (Madison: 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1995). 
45 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution, vol. 3 at 380 (Jonathon Elliot ed.) (1836) 
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1836). 
46 Id. at 386. 
47 Id. at 658-59. 
48 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra 
note 44, at 298. 
49 Id. at 316. 
50 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution, supra note 45, at 335. 




Second Amendment. The right to bear arms had universal 
support. 
 An argument has been made that the Second 
Amendment was adopted to protect slavery.51  Not only is 
there no direct evidence of this, but as indicated above, the 
Northern states led the effort to guarantee the right to bear 
arms, and the recent attempt by the British to disarm the 
Americans was the focus in the critical debates in the Virginia 
convention.  The defect in the early American polity was that, 
because of slavery, the liberties in the Bill of Rights did not 
extend to all Americans. 
 James Madison drafted what became the Bill of Rights.  
In notes he prepared for introducing the amendments to the 
House of Representatives in 1789, Madison averred that 
“[t]hey relate 1st to private rights,” and observed a fallacy “as 
to English Decl[aratio]n. of Rights – 1. mere act of 
parl[iamen]t.  2. no freedom of press – . . . arms to 
protest[an]ts.”52  By contrast, in America, rights would be 
protected by the Constitution and not be subject to repeal by 
the legislature, and these rights would be expanded to 
recognize the press and not to limit the right to arms to 
Protestants.   
 Madison introduced his draft to the House on June 8, 
1789.  It included the provision: “The right of the people to 
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed . . . .”53  While 
several states had proposed simply “that the people have a 
right to keep and bear arms,” Madison inserted the stronger 
guard that this right “shall not be infringed.” 
 Similarly, in 1790, the Pennsylvania Declaration of 
Rights was revised to provide: “That the right of the citizens to 
bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not be 
questioned.”54  James Wilson, a Justice on the U.S. Supreme 
 
51 Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 309 (1998). 
52 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 
The Univ. Press of Virginia 1979). 
53 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at 10 (Charlene Bangs Bickford ed., John 
Hopkins Univ. Press 1986).  
54 Pa. Dec. of Rights, art. XXI (1790); THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO 
CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790 305 (Harrisburg, Pa., 
John S. Wiestling, 1825). 
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Court, presided over the convention and was a member of the 
committee that drafted it.55 
 In his lectures on the law published in 1804, Wilson 
stated that “the great natural law of self preservation . . . 
cannot be repealed, or superseded, or suspended by any 
human institution,” adding: 
 
This law, however, is expressly recognised in 
the constitution of Pennsylvania.  “The right of 
the citizens to bear arms in the defence of 
themselves shall not be questioned.”  This is 
one of our many renewals of the Saxon 
regulations.  “They were bound,” says Mr. 
Selden, “to keep arms for the preservation of 
the kingdom, and of their own persons.”56 
 
 Just before the above passage, Wilson copied the 
following from William Hawkins: “In some cases, there may 
be affray, where there is no actual violence; as where a man 
arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a 
manner, as will naturally diffuse a terrour among the 
people.”57  Ignoring the phrase “in such manner,” Patrick 
Charles asserts that passages like this show that “the carrying 
of dangerous weapons in the public concourse – without the 
license of government – is what placed the people in great fear 
or terror . . . .”58  That further disregards the Pennsylvania’s 
explicit declaration of “the right of the citizens to bear arms in 
defense of themselves . . . .” 
 St. George Tucker’s 1801 edition of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries contrasted the Second Amendment from the 
English Declaration of Rights as follows:  “The right of the 
 
55 THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 
AND 1790 153-54 (Harrisburg, Pa., John S. Wiestling, 1825).  
56 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 657 (Harvard Univ. Press 1967) 
(quoting Nathaniel Bacon, AN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
OF THE LAWS AND GOVERNMENT OF ENGLAND.  1 COLLECTED FROM 
SOME MANUSCRIPT NOTES OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 40 (London: D. 
Browne & A. Millar) (1760)).  
57 Id. at 654 (citing 1 Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, 135). 
58 Patrick J. Charles, The Statute of Northampton by the Late Eighteenth 
Century: Clarifying the Intellectual Legacy, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 10, 21 
(2013). 




people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed . . . and 
this without any qualification as to their condition or degree, 
as is the case in the British government . . . .”59  Tucker called 
this right “the true palladium of liberty,” adding that “[t]he 
right of self defence is the first law of nature” and that 
wherever the right to bear arms is prohibited, “liberty, if not 
already annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.”60  
 Sir Matthew Hale, in Pleas of the Crown, noted a 
presumption of warlike force in the use of weapons by an 
assembly without the king’s licence, other than in a lawful 
case.  Tucker asked: 
 
But ought that circumstance of itself, to create 
any such presumption in America, where the 
right to bear arms is recognized and secured in 
the constitution itself?  In many parts of the 
United States, a man no more thinks, of going 
out of his house on any occasion, without his 
rifle or musket in his hand, than an European 
fine gentleman without his sword by his side.61 
 
 In support of his argument that the Second 
Amendment guarantees no right of a citizen to carry firearms 
for self-defense, Saul Cornell argues that Tucker was referring 
only to militiamen carrying military arms, excluding pistols, 
and that the practice was limited to Virginia.62  But Tucker 
referred simply to a man leaving his house “on any occasion” 
with a firearm, contrasting him with a European gentleman 
carrying a sword, neither without any military context.  Nor 
did Tucker’s statement conflict with the views of any other 
American jurist. 
 Kentucky’s Constitution of 1792 declared “that the 
right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and 
 
59 1 St. George Tucker, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, at *143 n.40 
(Philadelphia: William Young Birch & Abraham Small) (1803).  
60 Id., app., at 300. 
61 Id., vol. 5, at 19. 
62 Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home: 
Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1695, 1710-11 (2012). 
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the state shall not be questioned.”63  A treatise by Charles 
Humphreys entitled Compendium of the Common Law in Force in 
Kentucky analyzed Blackstone and sought to determine what 
in English law was still valid and what had become obsolete in 
America.  On the subject at hand he wrote: 
 
Riding or going armed with dangerous or 
unusual weapons, is a crime against the public 
peace, by terrifying the people of the land, 
which is punishable by forfeiture of the arms, 
and fine and imprisonment.  But here it should 
be remembered, that in this country the 
constitution guaranties to all persons the right 
to bear arms; then it can only be a crime to 
exercise this right in such a manner, as to terrify 
the people unnecessarily.  
We have a statute on the subject, related 
to concealed weapons.64 
 
 Again denying a Second Amendment right of 
individuals to bear arms, Saul Cornell asserts that the above 
deviates from the common law and was unique to the South.65  
To the contrary, Humphreys stated the traditional rule that 
going armed was a crime only when done in a manner to 
terrify the people, and the Second Amendment’s confirmation 
of that rule would discourage deviation therefrom. 
 Kentucky’s 1813 prohibition on wearing a pocket pistol 
and certain edged weapons concealed was declared 
unconstitutional in Bliss v. Commonwealth, which held:  
“Whatever restrains the full and complete exercise of that 
right, though not an entire destruction of it, is forbidden by 
the explicit language of the constitution.”66  In 1849, the 
 
63 Ky. Const., art. XII, § 22 (1792). 
64 Charles Humphreys, COMPENDIUM OF THE COMMON LAW IN FORCE 
IN KENTUCKY 482 (Lexington, Ky.: William Gibbes Hunt) (1822).  
65 Saul Cornell, The Right to Keep and Carry Arms in Anglo-American 
Law: Preserving Liberty and Keeping the Peace, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 11, 35 (2017). 
66 Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 91-92 (1822). 




guarantee was revised to authorize the legislature to “pass 
laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed arms.”67 
 The federal and state constitutional declarations of the 
right to “bear arms” preclude any argument that somehow the 
common law in America prohibited peaceably going armed.  
Further, the passage of restrictions on concealed weapons 
indicate that going armed, without more, was not already 
unlawful under the common law.  Meanwhile the courts 
would uphold such laws as long as open carry was allowed. 
C. GOING ARMED IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: STATUTORY 
MODELS 
1. VIRGINIA’S ACT ON AFFRAYS, 1786 
 In Virginia, a Committee of Revisors—of which 
Thomas Jefferson played the leading role—drafted a 
restatement of the statutory law which included the common 
law and elements of such English statutes as were deemed 
applicable.68  One of the provisions reported by the 
Committee, presented to the General Assembly by James 
Madison, would be passed as an Act Forbidding and 
Punishing Affrays (1786).69   It reformulated the Statute of 
Northampton to provide that no man shall “come before the 
Justices of any court, or other of their ministers of justice doing 
their office, with force and arms, . . . nor go nor ride armed by 
night nor by day, in fairs or markets, or in other places, in 
terror of the country . . . .”70  This offense had three pertinent 
elements: (1) going or riding armed; (2) in fairs, markets or 
 
67 Ky. Const., art. XIII, § 25 (1849). 
68 Edward Dumbauld, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE LAW 134-36 
(1978). 
69 2 Jefferson, PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 519-20 (Julian P. Boyd 
ed., 1951). “This Bill is a good example of TJ’s retention of the 
language of early English statutes, with its archaic provision for the 
forfeiture of ‘armour,’ &c.  It is also a good example of TJ’s ability to 
condense the involved language of the earlier English statutes that 
he thought worthy of retaining in the revision . . . .”  Id. at 520 (note 
by editor). 
70 A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 
VIRGINIA, OF A PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN 
FORCE, ch. 21, at 30 (1803). 
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“other places,” which according to the canon of noscitur a sociis 
(associated words) meant other places like fairs and markets; 
and (3) in terror of the country. 
 A sufficient indictment of the above could not simply 
allege the first element but would have been required to allege 
all three.  As Virginia courts held, it was “an established rule, 
that in general, if an Indictment pursues the words of a Statute 
in describing an offence, . . . it is sufficient . . . .”71  A demurrer 
(motion to dismiss) would be sustained for an insufficient 
indictment.72 
 It is unclear how long the Virginia law remained on the 
books, and no judicial decision exists reciting its language.  
Had it been read to ban the mere carrying of firearms, its 
draftsman Thomas Jefferson would have been one of its 
biggest violators, as he regularly went armed and defended 
the right to do so.73  As he advised his 15-year old nephew: 
“Let your gun therefore be the constant companion of your 
walks.”74 
 If it was still law in 1838, the enactment was not 
interpreted to prohibit the habitual carrying of concealed 
weapons, as in that year the legislature for the first time 
provided: “If a free person, habitually, carry about his person 
hid from common observation, any pistol, dirk, bowie knife, 
or weapon of the like kind, he shall be fined fifty dollars.”75  
This provision would have been unnecessary if going armed 
was already an offense, not to mention that this provision only 
restricted going armed habitually and hiding the arms.  Law 
enforcement officers were not exempt—the Virginia high court 
affirmed the conviction of a constable who “drew out a pistol 
and dirk” against a person to levy an execution.76 
 In 1847, Virginia enacted the following: “If any person 
shall go armed with any offensive or dangerous weapon, 
 
71 Rasnick v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 356, 357 (1823).  
72 Commonwealth v. Lodge, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 579, 580-81 (1845). 
73 See S. Halbrook, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT 131, 260, 
316-18 (2008).  In 1803, Jefferson wrote an innkeeper that “I left at 
your house . . . a pistol in a locked case,” and asked that a friend pick 
it up.  See original letter at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=mtj1&fileName=mtj1page029.db&recNum=210. 
74 Jefferson, WRITINGS 816-17 (Merril D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
75 VA CODE tit. 54, ch. 196, § 7 (1849). 
76 Hicks v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 597, 598 (1850). 




without reasonable cause to fear an assault or other injury, or 
violence to his person, or to his family or property, he may be 
required to find sureties for keeping the peace.”77  Any person 
engaging in the subject conduct, if anyone complained, could 
continue doing if the court did not find that keeping the peace 
required sureties.  If sureties were required, he could simply 
obtain them.  There are no published judicial decisions on the 
provision.   
 At a more general level, courts could require a person 
to enter into a recognizance with sureties to keep the peace, 
particularly in regard to a specified person who was 
threatened, for a given period.78  If a person violated the 
recognizance, a writ of scire facias could be issued alleging the 
violation with specificity and requiring the person to answer 
in court.79  Specific threats or harm were required for a finding 
that sureties were needed to ensure that the person kept the 
peace. 
 Virginia’s only prohibition on carrying a firearm per se 
applied to African Americans.  As discussed below, slaves 
could not keep or carry a gun, and free persons of color were 
required to obtain a license to do so, which the court had 
discretion to issue or not issue. 
2. THE MASSACHUSETTS MODEL, 1795 
 The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780 
provided: “The people have a right to keep and bear arms for 
the common defence.”80  A Massachusetts Act of 1795 
incorporated a version of the Statute of Northampton in the 
following words: 
 
That every Justice of the Peace, within 
the county for which he may be commissioned, 
may cause to be staid and arrested, all affrayers, 
rioters, disturbers, or breakers of the peace, and 
such as shall ride or go armed offensively, to the fear 
or terror of the good citizens of this Commonwealth, 
 
77 1847 Va. Laws 127, 129, § 16. 
78 Welling's Case, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 670 (1849). 
79 Randolph v. Brown, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 351 (1823). 
80 Mass. Dec. of Rights, art. XVII (1780). 
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or such others as may utter any menaces or 
threatening speeches, and upon view of such 
Justice, confession of the delinquent, or other 
legal conviction of any such offence, shall 
require of the offender to find sureties for his 
keeping the Peace, and being of the good 
behaviour; and in want thereof, to commit him 
to prison until he shall comply with such 
requisition . . . .81   
 
 Elements of the offense included (1) riding or going 
armed, (2) offensively, i.e., not peaceably, and (3) to the fear or 
terror of the good citizens.  Just peaceably riding or going 
armed alone was not an offense.  As the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court stated the rule, every word defining a 
crime must be given meaning and charged in an indictment: 
 
The general principle applicable to criminal 
pleading requires that an indictment shall set 
forth, with technical particularity, every 
allegation necessary to constitute the offence 
charged; and the constitution, adopting and 
sanctioning this principle, provides, “that no 
subject shall be held to answer for any crime or 
offence, until the same is fully, substantially 
and formally described to him.”82 
 
The explicit definition of the crime as riding or going armed 
“offensively, to the fear or terror of the good citizens” is given 
further meaning and context by the above associated crimes 
referring to “affrayers, rioters, disturbers, or breakers of the 
 
81 1795 Mass. Acts 436, ch. 2; 2 PERPETUAL LAWS OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 259 (1801) (emphasis added). 
82 Commonwealth v. Eastman, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 189, 223 (1848).  
The court added: “If an indictment for murder, should allege merely 
that the accused had committed the crime of murder upon the 
person of one A. B., or, if an indictment for larceny should simply set 
forth, that the defendant had stolen from C. D., in neither case would 
the offence be set forth with the particularity and precision required 
by law.” 




peace,” and those who “utter any menaces or threatening 
speeches.”   
 There are no judicial opinions on the 1795 enactment.  
However, an 1825 decision did differentiate being armed from 
misuse of arms: “The liberty of the press was to be 
unrestrained, but he who used it was to be responsible in case 
of its abuse; like the right to keep fire arms, which does not 
protect him who uses them for annoyance or destruction.”83 
3. THE REFINED MASSACHUSETTS MODEL, 1836 
 The 1795 Act was superseded by the Act of 1836, 
entitled “Of Proceedings to Prevent the Commission of 
Crimes,” which provided: 
 
If any person shall go armed with a 
dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive 
and dangerous weapon, without reasonable 
cause to fear an assault or other injury, or 
violence to his person, or to his family or 
property, he may, on complaint of any person 
having reasonable cause to fear an injury, or 
breach of the peace, be required to find sureties 
for keeping the peace, for a term not exceeding 
six months, with the right of appealing as 
before provided.84 
 
 The above did not prohibit a person from going armed 
with the specified weapons.  It required an aggrieved person 
to file a complaint and to show reasonable cause to fear injury 
or breach of the peace, and such a finding by the court would 
have to entail threats or other bad behavior.  Even then, the 
subject person could show reasonable cause to fear injury. If 
the court found otherwise and determined that his keeping the 
peace required sureties, the person could simply find sureties 
and continue going armed.  The following explains the 
procedures required by the Act. 
 Reasonable cause to fear an injury.  What would be 
required of a complainant to show “reasonable cause to fear 
 
83 Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 314 (1825). 
84 1836 Mass. Laws 748, 750, ch.134, § 16. 
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an injury”?  By analogy, a magistrate had to have “reasonable 
cause” to believe certain things to get a search warrant.  “The 
oath to the complainant’s belief, and not to his suspicion, is 
one of ‘the formalities prescribed by the laws,’ without which 
‘no warrant ought to be issued.’”85  Here, reasonable cause to 
fear an injury, not speculation or suspicion, was required. 
 Similar language was used in a decision regarding an 
indictment for a forcible entry, which “must be accompanied 
with circumstances tending to excite terror”: “There must at 
least be some apparent violence; or some unusual weapons; or 
the parties attended with an unusual number of people; some 
menaces, or other acts giving reasonable cause to fear, that the 
party making the forcible entry will do some bodily hurt to 
those in possession, if they do not give up the same.”86  The 
mere presence of ordinary weapons, without more, would not 
suffice. 
 Reasonable cause to fear a breach of the peace.  A breach of 
the peace was not considered a minor manner—one case 
referred to “breaches of the peace or other great disorder and 
violence, being what are usually considered mala in se or 
criminal in themselves . . . .”87  Reasonable cause to fear such 
would entail anticipated violence or related unlawful conduct: 
“Breaches of the peace comprise not only cases of actual 
violence to the person of another, but any unlawful acts, 
tending to produce an actual breach of the peace . . . .”88  
Under a 1783 enactment, “justices of the peace had power to 
bind over to keep the peace those who are complained of as 
having a present intent to commit a breach of the peace, as 
 
85 Commonwealth v. Lottery Tickets, 59 Mass. 369, 372 (1850) 
(citation omitted). 
86 Commonwealth v. Shattuck, 58 Mass. 141, 145 (1849) (emphasis 
added);  see also Commonwealth v. Dudley, 10 Mass. 403, 409 (1813) 
(“There must be some apparent violence offered, in deed or in word, 
to the person of another; or the party must be furnished with 
unusual offensive weapons, or attended by an unusual multitude of 
people; all which circumstances would tend to excite terror in the 
owner”). 
87 Commonwealth v. Willard, 39 Mass. 476, 478 (1839); see Fifty 
Associates v. Howland, 59 Mass. 214, 218 (1849) (reference to “such a 
degree of force, as would tend to a breach of the peace”). 
88 Pearce v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324, 332 (1816) (citing 4 Bl. Com. 255). 




well as those who are charged with having committed such an 
offence . . . .”89 
 On complaint of any person.  When a complaint was 
made that “any person has threatened to commit an offence 
against the person or property of another,” the magistrate was 
required to examine the complainant and any witnesses under 
oath and to prepare a written complaint.90  If the magistrate 
determined that “there is just cause to fear that any such 
offence may be committed,” he issued a warrant reciting the 
substance of the complaint and directed an officer to 
apprehend the person.91   
 Finding sureties.  The Act reflected general remedies 
available to a person who was injured or feared injury or 
breach of the peace by another.  “When the person complained 
of is brought before the magistrate, he shall be heard in his 
defense, and he may be required to enter into a recognizance, 
with sufficient sureties, in such sum as the magistrate shall 
direct, to keep the peace” towards all persons but “especially 
towards the person requiring such security,” for no more than 
six months.92  As applied in a similar scenario, a threatened 
person “may apply to a magistrate, and ask that sureties to 
keep the peace may be required of one from whom he may 
apprehend any serious personal injury.”93 
 Appeal.  The defendant could appeal to the court of 
common pleas, which would hear the witnesses and could 
either discharge him or require him to enter into a new 
recognizance in a sum determined to be proper.94  
 Insufficient cause.  Alternatively, if on examination the 
magistrate determined that it did “not appear that there is just 
cause to fear that any such offence will be committed,” the 
person was to be discharged.  If the magistrate deemed the 
 
89 Commonwealth v. M’Neill, 36 Mass. 127, 141 (1837). 
90 Act of Feb. 1836, ch. 134 § 2, 1836 Mass. Laws 748; see 
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 80 Mass. 382 (1860) (a complaint would 
have one’s full name, a sworn statement of the complaint, and a 
signature.  It would be certified by the appropriate authority, which 
was “an averment by him that the signature and oath were those of 
the complainant . . . .”). 
91 Id. § 3. 
92 Id. § 4. 
93 Mason v. Mason, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 506, 508 (1837). 
94 Act of Feb. 1836, ch. 134 §§ 9-11, 1836 Mass. Laws 748. 
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complaint “unfounded, frivolous or malicious,” he could 
order the complainant to pay the costs of the prosecution.95  As 
held in a prior decision, a groundless complaint could have 
further consequences: “A false complaint, made with express 
malice, or without probable cause, to a body having 
competent authority to redress the grievance complained of, 
may be the subject of an action for a libel; and the question of 
malice is to be determined by the jury.”96 
 The above procedures were not required for certain 
offenses committed in the presence of a magistrate.  Any 
person who would “make an affray, or threaten to kill or beat 
another, or to commit any violence or outrage against his 
person or property,” or would “contend with hot and angry 
words, to the disturbance of the peace,” could be ordered to 
keep the peace or be of good behavior.97  No further process or 
other proof was required.98  This provision identifies the types 
of analogous behavior included in the next section about going 
armed in a manner causing a person to have “reasonable cause 
to fear an injury, or breach of the peace.”99  
 Failing to keep the peace.  Generally, if a person who 
violated his recognizance to keep the peace such as by 
assaulting the complainant, the Commonwealth could 
prosecute an action of debt upon this forfeited recognizance, 
or bring a writ of scire facias.100  It was decided in one case: 
“Where one, being under a recognizance to keep the peace, 
committed a breach of the peace, for which he was indicted 
and fined, it was held that he was nevertheless liable to an 
action for the penalty of the recognizance.”101 
 In sum, as exemplified by Virginia and Massachusetts, 
the statutory offense of going armed to the terror of the people 
required proof that the defendant did so in an offensive 
manner that terrified actual persons.  Further, provisions 
requiring persons who went armed to find sureties to keep the 
peace required findings of offensive behavior that threatened 
 
95 Id. § 7. 
96 Bodwell v. Osgood, 20 Mass. 379 (1825). 
97 Allen v. State, 183 Wis. 323, 331 (1924). 
98 Act of Feb 1836, ch. 134 § 15, 1836 Mass. Laws 748. 
99 Id. § 16. 
100 Commonwealth v. Green, 12 Mass. 1 (1815). 
101 Commonwealth v. Braynard, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 113 (1828). 




the peace.  Peaceably carrying arms was not subject to any 
sanction. 
D. GOING ARMED IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: JUDICIAL 
PRECEDENTS 
 To what extent was the prohibition of the Statute of 
Northampton recognized as a common law offense in 
America?  The courts of Tennessee and North Carolina 
grappled with the issue, with the former questioning its 
applicability and the latter holding that it was.  The latter also 
provided significant detail regarding how both going armed 
and doing so to the terror of the people were separate 
elements of the offense, both of which must be alleged in the 
indictment and proven to the jury. 
1. TENNESSEE: SIMPSON V. STATE 
 In Simpson v. State, the Supreme Court of Errors and 
Appeals of Tennessee dismissed an indictment alleging that 
“William Simpson, laborer, with force and arms being arrayed 
in a warlike manner, in a certain public street or highway 
situate, unlawfully, and to the great terror and disturbance of 
divers good citizens, did make an affray . . . .”102  The court 
held that the indictment was insufficient as it failed to allege 
the elements of an affray of fighting between two or more 
persons.    
 The Attorney General sought to rely on Hawkins’ 
claim that “there may be an affray . . . where a man arms 
himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a 
manner as will naturally cause terror to the people, which is 
said always to have been an offence at common law, and is 
strictly prohibited by many statutes.”103  That doctrine, 
averred the court, relied “upon ancient English statutes, 
enacted in favor of the king, his ministers and other servants, 
especially upon the statute of the 2d Edward III,” which 
 
102 Simpson v. State, 13 Tenn. Reports (5 Yerg.) 356, 361 (1833). 
103 Id. at 357-58 (citing WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS 
OF THE CROWN OR A SYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS RELATING TO 
THAT SUBJECT: DIGEFTED UNDER THEIR PROPER HEADS 70 (1716)). 
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provided that no man “shall go or ride armed by night or by 
day, etc.”104   
 The Simpson court repeated Hawkins’ comment about 
the Statute of Northampton “that persons of quality are in no 
danger of offending against this statute by wearing their 
common weapons” in places and on occasions where 
common.105  The court held the English statute, at least as 
construed by the Attorney General, not to be incorporated into 
American common law: 
 
It may be remarked here, that ancient English 
statutes, from their antiquity and from long 
usage, were cited as common law; and though 
our ancestors, upon their emigration, brought 
with them such parts of the common law of 
England, and the English statutes, as were 
applicable and suitable to their exchanged and 
new situation and circumstances, yet most 
assuredly the common law and statutes, the 
subject-matter of this fourth section,106 formed 
no part of their selection.107 
 
 The Simpson court held in the alternative that if the 
Statute of Northampton had been brought to America, it was 
abrogated by Tennessee’s constitutional guarantee “that the 
freemen of this state have a right to keep and to bear arms for 
their common defence.”108  That guarantee precluded 
recognition of “a man’s arming himself with dangerous and 
unusual weapons” as part of the crime of an affray.  “By this 
clause of the constitution, an express power is given and 
secured to all the free citizens of the state to keep and bear 
arms for their defence, without any qualification whatever as 
to their kind or nature . . . .”  The constitution having thus said 
that “the people may carry arms,” doing so in itself could not 
 
104 Id. at 358. 
105 Id. at 358-59. 
106 i.e., Hawkins, supra note, at 103. 
107 Id. at 359. 
108 Id. at 360 (quoting TENN. CONST., art. 11, § 26). 




be the basis of the element of “terror to the people” necessary 
for an affray.109 
 Recall the flimsy allegations of the bare-bones 
indictment that the laborer Simpson with no detail other than 
that “with force and arms being arrayed in a warlike 
manner”—who knows what specific act that legalese applied 
to—“to the great terror” of unidentified citizens, he made an 
“affray” with no one.110 
2. NORTH CAROLINA: STATE V. HUNTLEY 
 By contrast to the above case, the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina upheld indictments with language and under 
reasoning reflecting the legacy of the Statute of Northampton 
as including both going armed and doing so in a concrete 
manner to terrorize specific people.  In State v. Langford, the 
indictment alleged that the defendants “with force and arms, 
at the house of one Sarah Roffle, an aged widow woman, . . . 
did then and there wickedly, mischievously and maliciously, 
and to the terror and dismay of the said Sarah Roffle, fire 
several guns . . . .”111  As the court stated, “men were armed 
with guns, which they fired at the house of an unprotected 
female, thus exciting her alarm for the safety of her person and 
her property.  This is the corpus delicti . . . .”112  The court 
recalled the words of Hawkins that “there may be an affray 
when there is no actual violence: as when a man arms himself 
with dangerous and unusual weapons, in such a manner as 
will naturally cause a terror to the people . . . .”113 
 Similarly, in State v. Huntley, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court upheld an indictment alleging that the 
defendant, “with force and arms, . . . did arm himself with 
pistols, guns, knives and other dangerous and unusual 
weapons, and, being so armed,” publicly threatened before 
various citizens “to beat, wound, kill and murder” another 
person and others, causing citizens to be “terrified,” all “to the 
 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 361. 
111 State v. Langford, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 381 (1824). 
112 Id. at 383. 
113 Id.  
THE COMMON LAW AND THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BEAR ARMS    125  
 
 
terror of the people . . . .”114  The court quoted Blackstone’s 
references to “the offence of riding or going armed with 
dangerous or unusual weapons, . . . by terrifying the good 
people of the land,” and to the Statute of Northampton.115  It 
further quoted Hawkins’ reference to an affray as including 
“where a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual 
weapons in such a manner, as will naturally cause a terror to 
the people . . . .”116 
 The Huntley court next turned to the guarantee of the 
North Carolina bill of rights securing to every man the right to 
“bear arms for the defence of the State.”  While this “secures to 
him a right of which he cannot be deprived,” he has no right 
to “employ those arms . . . to the annoyance and terror and 
danger of its citizens . . . .”117  That said, “the carrying of a gun 
per se constitutes no offence.  For any lawful purpose—either 
of business or amusement—the citizen is at perfect liberty to 
carry his gun.”118  However, he may not carry a weapon “to 
terrify and alarm, and in such manner as naturally will terrify 
and alarm, a peaceful people.”119 
E. PROHIBITIONS ON CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS 
 It was not an offense at common law or in the statutes 
of any state at the Founding peaceably to carry a concealed 
weapon.  Going armed without the arm being seen inherently 
could not cause terror to anyone.  In the early Republic, some 
states enacted laws prohibiting the carrying of arms in a 
concealed manner.  Finding it necessary to do so further 
demonstrates that there was no preexisting common law 
offense of going armed per se. 
 Given that a ban on concealed carry was 
unprecedented, it was no small wonder that the first judicial 
decision thereon by a state court declared it unconstitutional.  
In Bliss v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
reasoned that “in principle, there is no difference between a 
 
114 State v. Huntley, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 418, 419 (1843). 
115 Id. at 420-21 (quoting 4 Bl. Com. 149). 
116 Id. at 421 (quoting Haw. P. C. B. 1, ch. 28, sect. 1). 
117 Id. at 422. 
118 Id. at 422-23. 
119 Id. at 423. 




law prohibiting the wearing concealed arms, and a law 
forbidding the wearing such as are exposed; and if the former 
be unconstitutional, the latter must be so likewise.”120  What if 
the legislature banned open carry, the court asked?  It 
reasoned that the rule could not be that whichever mode of 
carry was banned first was thereby constitutional.121 
 The sister courts of other states rejected that view and 
upheld the bans on concealed carry because open carry was 
allowed.  The Alabama Supreme Court said it this way in 
upholding  the conviction of a sheriff for carrying a concealed 
pistol: “A statute which, under the pretence of regulating, 
amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires arms 
to be so borne as to render them wholly useless for the 
purpose of defence, would be clearly unconstitutional.”122 
 The Georgia Supreme Court overturned the conviction 
of a defendant “for having and keeping about his person, and 
elsewhere, a pistol, the same not being such a pistol as is 
known and used as a horseman’s pistol,” but where it was not 
alleged that he carried it concealed.123  While Georgia had no 
state constitutional guarantee to bear arms, the court reasoned: 
“The language of the second amendment is broad enough to 
embrace both Federal and state governments . . . . Is it not an 
unalienable right, which lies at the bottom of every free 
government?”124 
 By contrast, the Supreme Court of Indiana, in a one-
sentence opinion, stated: “It was held in this case, that the 
statute of 1831, prohibiting all persons, except travelers, from 
wearing or carrying concealed weapons, is not 
unconstitutional.”125 
 While holding that a statute prohibiting the carrying of 
concealed weapons was not in violation of the Second 
Amendment, the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that the 
right to carry arms openly “placed men upon an equality. This 
is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
States, and which is calculated to incite men to a manly and 
 
120 Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90, 92 (Ky. 1822). 
121 Id. at 93. 
122 State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616-17 (1840). 
123 Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 247 (1846). 
124 Id. at 250. 
125 State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833) (emphasis in original). 
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noble defense of themselves, if necessary, and of their country 
. . . .”126 As this suggests, the open carry rule was tied into the 
social norms of the day. 
 Eric Ruben and Saul Cornell argue that the Nunn and 
the other above decisions, except for the Indiana case, are 
tainted because they were from “the slaveholding South” and 
that no right peaceably to carry firearms was recognized in the 
North.127 But there were no decisions on the right to bear arms 
from courts in the North because the Northern states did not 
restrict the peaceable carrying of arms, concealed or openly. 
Ruben and Cornell point to such laws as the 1836 
Massachusetts enactment analyzed extensively above, seeing 
no significance in the provision requiring a person to file a 
complaint that he or she had “reasonable cause to fear an 
injury, or breach of the peace” by the person going armed.128 
 In sum, the passage of prohibitions in some states on 
carrying concealed weapons and the decisions thereon 
upholding open carry again illustrate that there was no 
recognized common law offense simply of going armed 
without more. It would have been unnecessary to restrict 
concealed carry if both concealed and open carry were already 
crimes under the common law. Moreover, more Southern 
judicial decisions rendered carry bans unconstitutional only 
because the Northern states had no prohibitions on peaceably 
carrying arms. 
F. PROHIBITIONS AND LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR 
AFRICAN AMERICANS 
1. THE SLAVE CODES 
 From colonial times until adoption of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, slaves were prohibited from keeping and 
bearing arms in most circumstances or altogether. 
Additionally, free blacks were prohibited from possessing 
 
126 State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann 489, 490 (1850); see also State v. Jumel, 
13 La Ann. 399 (1858). 
127 Eric M. Ruben and Saul Cornell, Firearm Regionalism and Public 
Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J. 
FORUM 121, 123 (2015). 
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arms unless they obtained a license, which was subject to an 
official’s discretion.  Such laws reflected that African 
Americans were not trusted or recognized to be among “the 
people” with the rights of citizens.  
 Virginia law provided that “[n]o negro or mulatto 
slave whatsoever shall keep or carry any gun, powder, shot, 
club or other weapon whatsoever, offensive or defensive,” 
punishable by no more than thirty-nine lashes, except those 
living at a frontier plantation could be licensed to “keep and 
use” such weapons by a justice of the peace.129  Further, “[n]o 
free negro or mulatto, shall be suffered to keep or carry any 
fire-lock of any kind, any military weapon, or any powder or 
lead, without first obtaining a license from the court” where he 
resided, “which license may, at any time, be withdrawn by an 
order of such court.”130   
 As a Virginia court held, among the “numerous 
restrictions imposed on this class of people [free blacks] in our 
Statute Book, many of which are inconsistent with the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution, both of this State and of the 
United States,” were “the restriction upon the migration of 
free blacks into this State, and upon their right to bear 
arms.”131 
 In Georgia, it was unlawful “for any slave, unless in 
the presence of some white person, to carry and make use of 
fire arms,” unless the slave had a license from his master to 
hunt.132  It was also unlawful “for any free person of colour in 
this state, to own, use, or carry fire arms of any description 
whatever . . . .”133  Georgia’s high court held: “Free persons of 
color have never been recognized here as citizens; they are not 
 
129  VIRGINIA, REVISED CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA: BEING A 
COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, OF A 
PUBLIC AND PERMANENT NATURE, AS ARE NOW IN FORCE; WITH A 
GENERAL INDEX 111 § 7 (1819).  
130 Id. § 8. 
131 Aldridge v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. 447, 449 (Gen. Ct. 1824). 
132 HORATIO; CRAWFORD MARBURY, WILLIAM H. DIGEST OF THE LAWS 
OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, FROM ITS SETTLEMENT AT BRITISH PROVINCE, 
IN 1755, TO THE SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN 1800, INCLUSIVE 
424 (1802).  
1333 Ga. Laws § 7 226, 228 (1833). 
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entitled to bear arms, vote for members of the legislature, or to 
hold any civil office.”134 
 Maryland made it unlawful “for any negro or mulatto . 
. . to keep any . . . gun, except he be a free negro or mulatto . . . 
.”135  It was unlawful “for any free negro or mulatto to go at 
large with any gun . . . .”136  However, this did not “prevent 
any free negro or mulatto from carrying a gun . . . who shall . . 
. have a certificate from a justice of the peace, that he is an 
orderly and peaceable person . . . .”137  This requirement was 
based on such person’s status as less than a citizen.  As one 
court stated: “Free negroes were and are now ‘those who were 
emancipated from slavery, or born free, but subjected to 
various disabilities and penal enactments.’”138 
 Later, the above was made stricter to require a license 
not just to bear, but merely to keep a firearm: “No free negro 
shall be suffered to keep or carry a firelock of any kind, any 
military weapon, or any powder or lead, without first 
obtaining a license from the court of the county or corporation 
in which he resides . . . .”139 
 Delaware forbade “free negroes and free mulattoes to 
have, own, keep, or possess any gun [or] pistol,” except that 
such persons could apply to a justice of the peace for a permit 
to possess a gun or fowling piece, which could be granted 
with a finding “that the circumstances of his case justify his 
keeping and using a gun . . . .”140  The police power was said to 
justify restrictions such as “the prohibition of free negroes to 
own or have in possession fire arms or warlike 
instruments.”141  
 Alabama provided that “no slave shall keep or carry 
any gun,” but added that “any justice of the peace may grant . 
. . permission in writing to any slave, on application of his 
 
134 Cooper v. Savannah, 4 Ga. 72 (1848). 
135 VIRGIL MAXCY, LAWS OF MARYLAND. WITH THE CENTER, THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE, AND ITS ALTERATIONS, 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES, AND ITS AMENDMENTS 297 (1811). 
136 Id. at 298. 
137 Id. 
138 Brown v. State, 23 Md. 503, 508 (1865). 
139 Otho, et al. Scott. Maryland Code, 464 (1860).  
140 Laws of the State of Delaware ch. 176 § 1, 8, at 208 (1841). 
141 State v. Allmond, 7 Del. 612, 641 (Gen. Sess. 1856). 




master or overseer, to carry or use a gun and ammunition 
within the limits of said master’s or owner’s plantation . . . .”142  
In short, a slave had to have a license to possess a gun, but it 
could not be removed from the plantation. 
 The above is just a sampling of some of the slave code 
provisions and how they applied to free blacks.  Licensing was 
purely discretionary based on the issuing authority’s 
determination of the applicant’s circumstances or need to keep 
or carry a firearm. 
2. NORTH CAROLINA’S DISCRETIONARY LICENSING FOR 
FREE PERSONS OF COLOR 
 North Carolina typically provided that “no slave shall 
go armed with Gun,” unless he had a certificate to carry a gun 
to hunt, issued with the owner’s permission.143  Its 
discretionary license-issuance system applicable to free 
persons of color was explained in more detail by judicial 
decisions in that state than in others, and merits further 
analysis. 
 North Carolina made it unlawful “if any free negro, 
mulatto, or free person of color, shall wear or carry about his 
or her person, or keep in his or her house, any shot gun, 
musket, rifle, pistol, sword, dagger or bowie-knife, unless he 
or she shall have obtained a licence therefor from the Court of 
Pleas and Quarter Sessions of his or her county . . . .”144  The 
provision was upheld in State v. Newsom as constitutional 
partly on the ground that “the free people of color cannot be 
considered as citizens . . . .”145  The court also opined that the 
 
142 JOHN G. AIKIN. DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA: 
CONTAINING ALL THE STATUTES OF A PUBLIC AND GENERAL NATURE, 
IN FORCE AT THE CLOSE OF THE SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
391-92 (1833). 
143 Statutes of the State of North Carolina 93 (1791). 
144 State v. Newsom, 27 N.C. 250, 250 (1844) (quoting Act of 1840, ch. 
30). 
145 Id. at 254.  Despite that, a defendant being tried “as a free negro, 
for carrying arms,” had a right not to exhibit himself to the jury to 
determine his status as a free negro, as that would violate his 
privilege against self-incrimination.  State v. Jacobs, 50 N.C. 259 
(1858). 
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Second Amendment only applied to the federal government, 
not to the states.146   
 Somewhat bizarrely, the court further stated: “It does 
not deprive the free man of color of the right to carry arms 
about his person, but subjects it to the control of the County 
Court, giving them the power to say, in the exercise of a sound 
discretion, who, of this class of persons, shall have a right to 
the licence, or whether any shall.”147  This is reminiscent of 
today’s judicial jargon that the right of the people to bear arms 
is not infringed by laws granting officials discretion to deny 
them that right. 
 Adding that having weapons by “this class of persons” 
was “dangerous to the peace of the community,” a later 
decision further explained the basis of the discretionary-
issuance policy:  
 
Degraded as are these individuals, as a class, by 
their social position, it is certain, that among 
them are many, worthy of all confidence, and 
into whose hands these weapons can be safely 
trusted, either for their own protection, or for 
the protection of the property of others 
confided to them. The County Court is, 
therefore, authorised to grant a licence to any 
individual they think proper, to possess and 
use these weapons.148 
 
 The court could not only deny a license outright, but 
also to limit a license to carry only in certain places.  In State v. 
Harris, a free person of color had a license to carry a gun on his 
own land, but he was hunting with a shotgun elsewhere with 
white companions.149  The court held that “the county court 
might think it a very prudent precaution to limit the carrying 
of arms to the lands of the free negro” and that the act did not 
“prevent the restriction from being imposed.”150 
 
146 Id. at 251. 
147 Id. at 253. 
148 State v. Lane, 30 N.C. 256, 257 (1848). 
149 State v. Harris, 51 N.C. 448 (1859) 
150 Id. at 449. 




 In short, free persons of color were not entitled to the 
right to keep and bear arms because they were not considered 
to be citizens with all the rights of citizens.  That status was 
reflected in the requirement that they obtain a license, subject 
to the issuing authority’s subjective decision of whether the 
applicant was a proper person with a proper reason. 
3. CITIZENSHIP: “TO KEEP AND CARRY ARMS WHEREVER 
THEY WENT” 
 As analyzed above, slaves and persons of color were 
not considered citizens, and thus having arms, if allowed at 
all, was subject to discretionary licensing by state authorities.  
Of course, the deprivation of arms was one of a bundle of 
disabilities bolstering the peculiar institution of slavery.  As St. 
George Tucker wrote: “To go abroad without a written 
permission; to keep or carry a gun, or other weapon; to utter 
any seditious speech; to be present at any unlawful assembly 
of slaves; to lift the hand in opposition to a white person, 
unless wantonly assaulted, are all offences punishable by 
whipping.”151 
 The Supreme Court, in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 
notoriously held that African Americans were not citizens and 
had no rights that must be respected.152  Chief Justice Taney 
noted that “the laws of the present slaveholding States . . . are 
full of provisions in relation to this class,” and such laws 
“have continued to treat them as an inferior class, and to 
subject them to strict police regulations . . . .”153  But if blacks 
were “entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, it 
would exempt them from the operation of the special laws and 
from the police regulations which they [whites] considered to 
be necessary for their own safety.”154 
 To avoid that result, Taney listed some of the 
prominent rights that African Americans would have, but of 
 
151 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY: WITH A 
PROPOSAL FOR THE GRADUAL ABOLITION OF IT, IN THE STATE OF 
VIRGINIA 65 (1796). 
152 Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
153 Id. at 412. 
154 Id. at 416-17. 
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which they were currently deprived in numerous states, 
should their citizenship be recognized: 
 
It would give to persons of the negro race, who 
were recognized as citizens in any one State of 
the Union, the right to enter every other State 
whenever they pleased, singly or in companies, 
without pass or passport, and without 
obstruction, to sojourn there as long as they 
pleased, to go where they pleased at every hour 
of the day or night without molestation, unless 
they committed some violation of law for which 
a white man would be punished; and it would 
give them the full liberty of speech in public 
and in private upon all subjects upon which its 
own citizens might speak; to hold public 
meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and 
carry arms wherever they went.155 
 
Overturning Dred Scott would be a primary objective of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which overruled that decision.156  
Senator George F. Edmunds explained shortly after the 
Amendment was ratified: “What was the fourteenth article 
designed to secure? . . .[T]hat the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States shall not be abridged or denied by 
the United States or by any State; defining also, what it was 
possible was open to some question after the Dred Scott 
decision, who were citizens of the United States.”157 
 In sum, having no arms right was an incident of 
slavery.  Even free blacks were required to obtain a license to 
possess or carry a firearm, which license could be denied or 
limited subject to the discretion of the issuing authority.  Such 
laws were based on the denial of the rights of citizenship to 
African Americans. 
 
155 Id. at 417 (emphasis added). 
156 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 307-08 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
157 Congressional Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1000 (1869). 





 The story does not end with the end of the early 
Republic.  Following the War of 1861-65, a new chapter in the 
history of the Second Amendment began.  While it is beyond 
the scope of this study, this new chapter involved the 
reenactment of the Slave Codes as the Black Codes that sought 
to keep African Americans unarmed, the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act and Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866 that 
sought to protect the Second Amendment rights and other 
rights of the freed slaves, and the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that sought in part to constitutionalize that 
protection.158 
 The Freedmen’s Bureau Act symbolized this era with 
its declaration that “the right . . . to have full and equal benefit 
of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, 
personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and 
disposition of estate, real and personal, including the 
constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and 
enjoyed by all the citizens . . . without respect to race or color, 
or previous condition of slavery.”159 
 Without delving further into that history here, it would 
be appropriate to mention in this law review that the 
Freedmen’s Bureau, which was charged with implementing 
the above mandate, was headed by General Oliver O. 
Howard.  In his autobiography, Howard chronicles the 
daunting task of assisting African Americans in their 
transition from slaves to freedmen in all spheres, from civil 
rights and work conditions to education and voting.  He was 
instrumental in the founding of Howard University,160 which 
was established as a college for freedmen and is today the 
largest historically-black university nationwide, as well as 
Lincoln Memorial University, which was founded as a college 
for the Cumberland Gap region and whose law school 
 
158 See generally STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, SECURING CIVIL RIGHTS: 
FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, & THE RIGHT TO BEAR 
ARMS (2010). 
159 Freedmen’s Bureau, 14 Stat. 176-177 (1866) (quoted in McDonald, 
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160 See 2 O. O. HOWARD, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF OLIVER OTIS HOWARD 
340-401, 452-55 (1908). 
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provides attorneys for the often under-served region of 
Appalachia and beyond.161  Having taught in the philosophy 
department at Howard University decades ago, this author 
was pleasantly surprised to learn of this connection when 
invited to present at the Second Amendment Symposium 
sponsored by the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review. 
* * *  
 While it would be a delusional reach to claim that the 
Second Amendment implicitly incorporated the Statute of 
Northampton of 1328, no question exists that the right to bear 
arms does not include the carrying of dangerous and unusual 
weapons to the terror of one’s fellow citizens.  Peaceably 
carrying arms was not an offense at the Founding or in the 
early Republic, and instead was enshrined as a constitutional 
right at both state and federal levels.  Some states restricted 
carrying arms concealed, but allowed open carry.  Prohibitions 
on the keeping and bearing of arms by African Americans, or 
the requirement that they obtain licenses to do so subject to 
the discretion of the authorities, were based on their condition 
as slaves or non-citizens. 
 To what extent may a State prohibit the peaceable 
bearing of arms, or limit the right to select persons determined 
by law enforcement officials to have a “need” to do so?  To 
date, the Supreme Court has not decided the validity of such a 
prohibition under the Second Amendment, but should do so. 
 
161 See id. at 568-69, 586-87; Lincoln Memorial University, Heritage 
and Mission, https://www.lmunet.edu/about-lmu/heritage-
mission.php (lasted visited Sept. 18, 2019). 
